A more objective life satisfaction theory of happiness

Albert Camus recounted the myth of Sisyphus, a man condemned by the gods to roll a gigantic boulder up a mountain, only to have it come tumbling down. Sisyphus is condemned to repeat his task for all eternity. Most would agree Sisyphus is miserable, and yet, in Camus’ famous words, “One must imagine Sisyphus happy.”

If one subscribes to the life satisfaction theory (LST) of happiness (as many do), Sisyphus represents a disquieting implication. The core idea of LST is someone is happy if the desires he judges he should fulfil, are fulfilled. Its appeal lies in this personal determination.

However, in the context of LST, Sisyphus seems to derive happiness from his subjective judgment of, or change of judgment to, ridiculously low standards. Robert Nozick articulates this objection to the subjectivity of LST: While acknowledging there are no objective standards for judgment, he worries constantly shifting them to “suit various situations in order to feel happy” will render happiness arbitrary. (Nozick 1989, p.114-115). In other words, life satisfactionists, to be happy, could make Sisyphean judgments.

Here, I propose three improvements to LST I argue provide a basis on which we can make subjective but non-arbitrary judgments, thereby avoiding Nozick’s objections but maintaining the subjective aspect of LST (which gives it its appeal). I will then address a relevant objection and show why it is misplaced. Finally, I demonstrate why Sisyphus’ happiness, while seemingly ridiculous, could actually be valid under this version of LST.

(I adopt LST as the theory of happiness used and would use the word ‘happiness’ when appropriate for purposes of understanding. I do not claim LST is the correct theory of happiness, if there is even such a thing — a theory, not happiness, hopefully.)

A reasonable judgment

To provide a basis to determine our standards, or the direction and extent to which we could change our standards, I refer to American philosopher T. M. Scanlon’s theory of moral reasoning, contractualism. Contractualism can be considered an attempt to ground relativistic judgments on an objective basis. Scanlon’s principles could thus ground LS judgments, despite its subjective nature, and avoid arbitrariness.

Scanlon proposes something is wrong if it “would be disallowed by (…) principles (…) no one could reasonably reject” (Scanlon 1998, p.153).

Scanlon’s theory comprises three key ideas:

• First, the primary predicate for a judgment is invalidity; judgments are valid insofar as it cannot be shown they are invalid. We do not need to affirm our judgments as being valid.
• Second, they must be reasoned; the 'protection from invalidity' comes from its reasonableness.
• Thirdly, reasoning is appraised independent of the agent; there needs to be reasoning with another rational agent for the resultant judgment to be valid.

Similarly, I propose LS judgments are valid insofar as they cannot be shown to be invalid (1a), and this stems from them being considered reasonable (1b), when assessed with other rational beings (1c).

I now argue for each of these requirements; how they are compatible with LST but avoid arbitrariness:

1a. Arguing from invalidity

Firstly, I demonstrate why we should evaluate our judgments from invalidity: if a judgment cannot be shown to be invalid, it should be considered valid.

Consider two persons. One judges his happiness based on satisfying his desire for the highest intellectual pursuit. Meanwhile, the other judges his happiness based on satisfying his desire for an uncomplicated, unintellectual life of simple comfort.

When we argue for one judgment being more rightful (and resulting in greater happiness) than another, we necessarily use some external standard (For the first person, it could be to exercise his highest mental faculties, while for the second, it could be to avoid unnecessary wasted effort and suffering). However, there is no objective reason why any extrinsic standard is more or less correct than another. Why should one value intellectualism over simplicity?

Instead, I think we should accept both judgments as valid, because either judgment cannot be argued against as being invalid. Changing the primary predicate (validity to invalidity) maintains the subjectivity of LST: it is possible to derive multiple valid judgments.

At the same time, there could be invalid judgments. Invalidity would be determined on some basis that avoids arbitrariness yet is as all-encompassing as possible. I argue this basis would be the reasonableness of the judgment’s justification (1b) and when appraised with other rational agents (1c).

1b. Reasonableness requirement

Consider the same ‘bare minimum’ standard of waking, breathing, eating and sleeping, but for different agents.

This standard could be reasonably plausible for a patient who has recovered from debilitating stroke. The reasonableness lies in the patient’s now-difficult access to this ‘minimum’. We could reasonably consider the possibility that experiencing them, given the lack of it, results in happiness for the patient.

Similarly, this standard could also apply to a patient who awoke from a long coma. However, the reasonableness now lies in the patient’s former inability to experience these basics, such that being able to experience them now results in happiness.

Here, the same experience generates happiness, but due to different reasons. We see it is the reasonableness which determines this judgment’s validity, not the judgment itself.

However, this judgment would not be applicable to most of us. We could not reasonably consider it plausible that this standard would lead to happiness for us, because, for us, these basics are already a given. (Indeed, there may be a psychological reason — we adjust to the new status quo, and seek out more.)

(Also, an interesting argument can be made here that happiness is not a state, but rather, a positive change from one state to a higher one. Thus, in the real, imperfect world, we could be happy by starting from very low standards!)

More importantly, reasonableness could imply this same judgment may not remain valid for the patients if they have returned to society, fully-functioning, after a reasonable amount of time. As circumstances change, the original justification diminishes to the point where we would consider it unreasonable that it still plausibly leads to happiness. If they want to continue adopting this standard, they must have another justification we can consider reasonably plausible for their happiness now.

Therefore, any judgment, or changes to them, must be based on a reasonably plausible justification.

This basis of reasonableness avoids arbitrariness: Random, immaterial whims we cannot reasonably consider having any substantial effect on our judgments, would be invalid. At the same time, the reasonableness allows us to judge our happiness on a scale, based on the power of the justification.

1c. Other rational agents

There is one more issue. In Scanlon’s formulation, he argues we must reason with other rational agents as part of the basis for evaluation.

However, there is a key distinction between contractualism as a moral theory and using this kind of ‘contractualist’ approach for happiness, which has a major implication on the role of other rational agents. As morality is other-regarding (it concerns how we treat and what we owe each other), but the pursuit of happiness is self-regarding ultimately (not in the sense of it being selfish, but that it is experienced by oneself), it could be the case the criteria we use for morality is overly stringent than what is sufficient for happiness.

When other rational agents are considered in contractualism as a moral theory, they provide an account of the authority of moral standards. By engaging in reasonable justification with other rational agents, we derive the substantive value of morality from the ‘mutual recognition’ we have with them (Ashford & Mulgan 2018).

However, it is questionable why ‘mutual recognition’ is necessary for happiness. It seems implausible how someone else’s external judgment would have any authority or impact on one’s internal happiness (at least if others do not influence our assessment of our happiness, which is technically possible). Requiring other rational agents seems to conflict with our intuitions that an agent’s determination of his own happiness should lie within the agent himself.

John Kekes provides a possible answer. He argues our standards are ontologically subjective but epistemologically objective: While one’s judgments about their happiness are made by oneself, they can still be subject to rational evaluation by others, independent of his personal choices. Kekes argues one’s judgment is necessary but not sufficient for his happiness. Rational justification is what makes it sufficient (Kekes 1982, p.369-370).

Then again, you may ask why one cannot reach a rational evaluation on his own. Kekes suggests one can: He argues if one’s judgment is supported by his independent rational evaluation, then both necessary and sufficient conditions are met. Therefore, Kekes’ ‘epistemological objectivity’ does not necessitate other rational agents.

I believe it is because Kekes’ idea of ‘reason’ evaluates a priori; the same conclusions will be reached regardless of which particular person is doing the reasoning, which Kekes implies is objective.

I agree with Kekes insofar as evaluation by others allows us to more effectively evaluate our judgements. However, I argue the other rational agents themselves are also necessary, in principle, to provide a full and valid judgment in addition to reason, beyond practical reasons. I argue our judgments are necessarily contingent on our circumstances, such that we cannot abstract from them and still make complete judgments.

Since most of us live and interact with other humans, and we are affected by others’ perception or responses to the things which provide us happiness. Hence, other people are important considerations in affecting our actual happiness.

Rational agents, as agents of our circumstances, reveal to us why some judgments are too ‘high’ or too ‘low’ for our particular context. They help us benchmark. Although there is nothing objective about the societal standards we happen to have, only by taking these contextual considerations and their impact into account, can we attain a more reasonable judgment. This context can only be provided by other rational agents. They serve as an essential part of our basis for evaluation, which also avoids arbitrariness.

(Of course, if one is able to completely disregard how others could or would affect their happiness, then this criterion may not apply.)

A response to the authoritativeness problem

While reasonableness is a core element of this version of LST, it still does not resolve a prominent objection by Daniel Haybron.

Haybron argues we can still adopt multiple standards, all perfectly reasonable, but there is no underlying reason why any one reasonable judgment is the authoritative one. This implies any judgment and the justification chosen by an agent, however reasonable, is ultimately arbitrary (Haybron 2011, p.5-6).

Haybron uses a woman who lost her husband of many years. She could be satisfied because she considers herself luckier than others, having had many years with him, but she could also be dissatisfied because of the hole in her life, how she is unluckier than her married friends. Not only are the two resultant evaluations contradictory, there is nothing to suggest one is more ‘right’ than the rest.

However, I believe authoritativeness is not the point. Authoritativeness implies there is only one evaluation, or we must arrive at a definitive, summative evaluation of our happiness. However, just like our lives, our reasonable LS judgments can be complicated and contradictory. There is no reason why they cannot exist concurrently nor why they must (or even could) be synthesised or weighed into an explicit evaluation.

To resolve Haybron’s concerns, I argue the judgment should not be separate from its justification, as it is the justification which gives it validity. The justification is not just the means we use to derive a judgment, but an unavoidable substantive part of it as well. We can acknowledge the woman as being both satisfied and dissatisfied and include the respective justifications for why this is so.

Sisyphus’ reasonable happiness

With this reasonable LST, let us consider why Sisyphus can be happy.

Firstly, I disagree, as with most people’s instincts, that Sisyphus can truly be ‘happy’ by just forcefully changing his standards alone.

However, if he has some reasonable justification why and how this ‘lower’ standard can still lead to some happiness for him (perhaps the developing of some skill, or finding some purpose smoothing the slope), that others could reasonably entertain as plausible, could Sisyphus’ happiness then be valid?

I believe so: Sisyphus’ happiness is not derived from the new standard (traditional LST), but from the reasoned justification, however warped but still plausible, which we could reasonably consider (reasonable LST). Sisyphus doesn’t settle for less. Instead, he recognises and reasonably makes the best out of his circumstances. In that sense, “One can reason Sisyphus happy.”

In conclusion, I believe these proposed improvements to LST could maintain subjectivity while avoiding arbitrariness, and thus deserve further investigation.

References
Ashford, Elizabeth, and Tim Mulgan. “Contractualism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford University, 20 Apr. 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractualism/.
Haybron, Daniel M. “Happiness and the Importance of Life Satisfaction.” 20 Nov. 2001.
Kekes, John. “Happiness.” Mind, XCI, no. 363, 1982, pp. 358–376., doi:10.1093/mind/xci.363.358.
Khoddam, R.. Why you may never be truly satisfied, and why that’s okay. Psychology Today, 2014
Mulnix, Jennifer Wilson, and Michael Joshua Mulnix. Happy Lives, Good Lives: A Philosophical Examination. Broadview Press, 2015
Nozick, Robert. “Happiness.” The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations. Simon & Schuster, 1989.
Scanlon, Thomas M. What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
Suikkanen, Jussi. “An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness.” International Journal of Wellbeing, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i1.7.
Mulnix, Jennifer Wilson, and Michael Joshua Mulnix. Happy Lives, Good Lives: A Philosophical Examination. Broadview Press, 2015
Nozick, Robert. “Happiness.” The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations. Simon & Schuster, 1989.
Scanlon, Thomas M. What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998.
Suikkanen, Jussi. “An Improved Whole Life Satisfaction Theory of Happiness.” International Journal of Wellbeing, vol. 1, no. 1, 2011, doi:10.5502/ijw.v1i1.7.

*A previous version was submitted as a midterm research paper for a module titled “Conditions of Happiness”. It has since undergone some revision in terms of the argument.